The Sacred Cows of Capitalism, Alive and Kicking
Wounded perhaps, but the sacred cows of capitalism are alive and kicking, according to a new World Bank working paper by Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Luis Serven. The authors of Are All the Sacred Cows Dead? argue that "the 'sacred cows' of financial and macro policies are very much alive...the on-going crisis does not simply reflect a failure of free markets, but a reaction of market participants to distorted incentives."
Demirguc-Kunt and Serven, however, aren't just adding another paper to the now large pile that do a post-mortem on the origins of the financial crisis. The approach is much more prospective than that. How are regulators and central bankers in emerging markets to deal with banking systems and financial markets facing severe stress? It's more of this type of analysis that's needed right at the moment.
On blanket guarantees (compare this to a recent post from Thorsten Beck):
It must be recognized that the short-term benefits of guarantees will vary with the fiscal strength of the guaranteeing government. To hasten the end of an insolvency driven banking crisis and to constrain the spread of insolvencies in the short term, the government must manifest a substantial capacity for absorbing losses. This is not a luxury most countries can afford since most governments do not have the required fiscal capacity. Depending on the depth of the systemic insolvency such support may not even halt the spread of crisis and delay healthy adjustments.
On government ownership of banks:
Given the extent to which lending policies are politicized, it is not surprising that state ownership appears to heighten the risk of crises instead of reducing it. If anything, research suggests that greater state ownership is associated with various measures of financial instability, including a greater probability of banking crises.
On market discipline and Basel II:
Many interpreted the crisis as a vivid example of market failure, evidence that there is no such thing as market discipline, reinforcing calls for stronger regulations through improvements in Basel II accord. But the crisis also spawned a growing argument about the role Basel I accord may have played in causing the crisis. Indeed, it is no secret that Basel I contributed to the growth in securitization by assigning lower capital charges and thus giving incentives to institutions to move their assets into off balance-sheet securitization vehicles. While advocates claimed that Basel II, had it been implemented earlier, could have lessened or prevented the turmoil, critics of the Basel approach to capital regulation pointed out that the crisis has simply reconfirmed fundamental flaws that have been evident in this approach.
>> Download a PDF of Are All the Sacred Cows Dead?
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Well, of course the whole Basel framework is silly and utterly dangerous. While an Executive Director at the World Bank I did my best to warn about it but to little or no avail.
Let me pose the following question that explains my objections to the minimum capital requirements and to the empowerment of the credit rating agencies as the supreme risk overseers.
What is more dangerous and could create more systemic risk…something that everyone knows is risky or something everyone believes is less risky?
Additionally, the Basel regulations signified creating an additional layer of taxes on risk, which goes against the needs of development.
Posted by: Per Kurowski | Jan 6, 2009 5:24:50 PM
The document states “it is no secret that Basel I contributed to the growth in securitization by assigning lower capital charges and thus giving incentives to institutions to move their assets into off-balance-sheet securitization vehicles.”
That is true, but worse, by introducing the concept of capital requirements based on a very uncertain concept of risk, the authorities blessed the buildup of leverage. Little risk “perception”…small capital requirements…as if we truly know what risk means.
Also, though a different issue, these capital requirements based on risk effectively introduced a regulatory tax on risk, on top of what the market needs to be paid for taking up risk. In a world where development depends so much on risk taking, this is indeed a crazy and risky thing to do.
Posted by: Per Kurowski | Jan 8, 2009 9:47:40 AM