Crisis Talk - The World Bank Group

Crisis Talk is Moving!

Dear Crisis Talk readers,

In an act of consolidation and collaboration, Crisis Talk is merging with the World Bank's Private Sector Development blog, where we will continue our conversation about emerging markets, finance, and the implications of the crisis.

We do not believe that the financial crisis is over and/or no longer worth discussing; rather, we feel that our discussion will compliment and be complimented by the ideas and insights offered by the PSD blog. Content that is strictly related to the financial crisis can be found under the Financial Crisis category.

For other crisis-related content, be sure to check out many of the World Bank's other blogs, including:

• East Asia and the Pacific on the Rise
• Africa Can End Poverty
• Growth and Crisis
• End Poverty in South Asia
• People Move
• CGAP Microfinance

In the meantime, we look forward to hearing from you at our new home.

Crisis Talk Team

Crisis Roundup

"It's Alive, It's ALIVE, It's ALLLIIIIVVVE!"

The economics profession may become more mathematical, and friendlier to women.

Unemployment in the US is going to be a problem for a long time.

Commodity prices aren't really based on fundamentals like weather and geopolitics.

Lords of Finance. Best business book of the year.

Brad DeLong ♥ Financial Times.

Surprise! Paul Krugman thinks that the stimulus is working, but wants it to be bigger.

China can't cool down its steel bubble.

There is a large gap between new and existing home sales in the United States.

People are eating out less frequently.

One bit of proof that the recovery is real.

Finally, the recession is taking its toll on California.

The Double-Edged Sword of Emerging Market Growth

The Economist has two interesting articles this week about capital flows in India. The Indian government is currently confronted with the a challenge of nurturing the growth of India's financial markets and multinationals, while mitigating the risks of excessive "hot money" flowing into the economy.

Proponents of capital controls point to India's success in avoiding the worst of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s and the current crisis, which was in part achieved by limiting the amount of money flowing in and out of the economy (for example, foreigners are limited in the amount of local bonds they can purchase).

Yet, India remains a sponge for foreign capital. The Economist notes that foreigners have invested $13.8 bn in India’s stockmarkets since April, having withdrawn $8.6 billion over the same period last year. The Sensex, India’s most widely watched stockmarket index, has surged by almost 100% since its March lows.

Advocates of a stricter capital controls are facing a strong resistance from the market...

What's New in Decoupling?

I recently wondered what the relationship between developed and emerging economies would look like during the recovery phase of the crisis:

Will a robust emerging market rebound boost OECD growth? Or, are we due to see a multi-speed global recovery?

John Authers points out that, thus far, the recovery has been quite heterogeneous:

The grand theory was that decoupling by emerging markets would be good for everyone- they would grow even if consumers in the developed world caught a cold, and help everyone through. The latest data suggest a decoupled world, but that does not seem so positive.

Authers highlights the Reserve Bank of India's recent decision to raise rates and the "stunning" recovery in South Korea. Meanwhile, consumer confidence in the US is awful. He concludes:

Asian economies are already at the point where overheating is the main danger, while US consumers, for all the money thrown at them, are still not feeling any better. This is not encouraging.

Meanwhile, equity indices are down and the dollar is up. Perhaps investors were a bit too sanguine, and are now sobering up?

More on bubbles

A few days ago I offered a series of bubble warnings from a German financial pundit, two academics, the man who broke the Bank of England, and the man who built Singapore. Today, we have a warning from the world's largest bond fund.

Free Exchange links to a discussion (via Buttonwood) about asset inflation, led by Pimco's Bill Gross.

Bottom line:

Cumulatively, asset values have risen twice as fast as GDP over the 50 year period. As Gross writes "you would have been far better off investing in paper than factories or machinery or the requisite components of an educated workforce."

Nuff said.

A Long Way To Go

There is a short but sweet article from All Roads Lead to China on Shanghai's 100 hardest jobs, which looks at the lives of China's poorer workers (who make up the bulk of the country's 1.3bn citizens). The editors conducted over 100 interviews with workers ranging from a cigarette salesman to a watermelon vendor.

I was particluarly struck by an interview with a hat salesman, who reminds the reader of the challenges facing China's underclass

Q: If there was one thing you could change about your job, what would it be?
A: Change? It is such a luxury to me. How can I dream about changing my current status? I want to do my own business, like opening my own restaurant, but who will give me the money? I want to recruit and train my employees, but who will teach me how to manage or run my place? I dare not think of change. I guess my only hope is my son. He is the one (sic) can bring real changes.

The authors note a recurring theme of "hope and opportunity for the next generation".

China's immense population is frequently criticized for saving too much and consuming too little, which makes the country dependent on exports in order to grow. These interviews serve as a reminder that, because many of China's citizens are placing their hopes with the next generation, saving is likely to remain a fact of life in China for a very long time.

(h/t China Law Blog)

Today in Bubbles

The editors of the Financial Times appear to be concerned about bubbles. Three out of today's four op-eds are dedicated to the theme.

First, George Soros argues that the implosion of 2008 was an aggregation of a series of bubbles over the past decades, creating, in his words, a "super-bubble":

The crash of 2008 was caused by the collapse of a super-bubble that has been growing since 1980. This was composed of smaller bubbles. Each time a financial crisis occurred the authorities intervened, took care of the failing institutions, and applied monetary and fiscal stimulus, inflating the super-bubble even further.

Weekend Reading

"Good news for investors who like to lose all their money". LTCM 3.0 is here.

The dangers of ultra cheap money.

Is US Government debt actually "risk-free"?

Historically, a weak dollar has been deflationary.

Great charts from Calculated Risk and Barry Ritholtz.

The average unemployment period in the US is at an all-time high.

Another take on why bankers make so much money.

Is Paul Krugman Panda-bashing?

"If you are going to be doing business in a foreign country, particularly China, it pays to do so legally and it pays to have the right visa."

South-South Trade Tensions

John Authers argues that the newsworthy economic story of late isn't dollar weakness; rather, it is the weak renminbi:

Many, if not most, hopes for global recovery are pinned on China buying goods from countries such as Brazil. Commodity prices, a key driver of equities and forex rates, also move in response to the new orders received by China's manufacturers.

This currency regime makes it far harder for such countries to sell to China. So it is no wonder that currencies are back at the top of the agenda.

China's currency is 15 percent cheaper against the dollar than it was in 1993. Meanwhile, many emerging market currencies are returning to their pre-crisis exchange rates.

China has been building stronger trade relations with the Global South for quite some time. It is now South Africa's top export destination. But many of these partnerships are built around China purchasing commodities, and selling manufactured goods. With a weakening currency, China is likely to purchase fewer non-commidty goods from its trading partners. This may lead to growing trade tensions, particluarly with countries who are not endowed with commodities.

The Case for Prudency: Latin America Edition

Bloggers at the IMF are looking at why Latin America fared better in this crisis than during previous episodes of financial duress. Their explanation: financial soundness mixed with enhanced credibility.

This improvement can be attributed to the fact that the region faced the crisis equipped with economic policy frameworks that were more solid and credible than in the past, and with smaller financial, external, and fiscal vulnerabilities. This allowed a number of countries of the region to implement countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies.

The estimates here suggest that these countries were able to “save” about 4 percentage points of GDP during the crisis, thanks to their better preparations for confronting external shocks.

A key element of this preparedness was credibility. Those countries which had responsibly managed their monetary and fiscal policies before the crisis were able to quickly lower interest rates, while increasing public expenditure and fiscal deficits. Countries such as Brazil, Chile and Peru managed to store away enough revenues from the commodity booms of the previous years in order to enact the necessary mix of countercyclical policies. Mexico, which is suffering from dwindling oil reserves, had less of a cushion, and has in turn struggled more than most of its neighbors.

Update: Vox has an interesting paper on the policy responses of Latin America Central Banks during the crisis, written by the former governor of the Central Bank of Ecuador.

Crisis Viewing

Our friends at PBS have released a couple of interesting crisis-related television programs this week.

First, Charlie Rose has an excellent interview with Andrew Ross Sorkin (type Sorkin's name into the Charlie Rose search window to access the video). Mr Sorkin discusses his just-released book, Too Big to Fail, telling the story of last year's Wall Street meltdown through the window of Paulon, Blankfein, Geithner, and other members of Wall Street's ruling coterie.

Next, Frontline has a new program entitled The Warning, which traces the roots to the crisis back through the 1990s. Naked Capitalism has several posts that provide useful background information to the characters and themes of the show.

Both are well worth viewing, particularly if you don't have time to read through Sorkin's 600+ page monster.

East Asian Production Networks: Beggar Thy Neighbor?

There is an interesting article in Econbrowser by Willem Thorbecke of the Asian Development Bank, which looks at East Asian Production Networks, Global Imbalances, and Exchange Rate Coordination.

Thorbecke highlights the important relationship between exchange rates and production chains in East Asia, arguing for increased policy coordination between the two. The paper presents both good news and bad news regarding East Asia's crisis recovery. First, the good news:

Signs are emerging that East Asian production networks are reviving. Imports for processing and processed exports both collapsed earlier this year. Since then, however, imports for processing have recovered 85 percent of their losses and processed exports 75 percent. Thus trade within East Asian production networks is recovering.

Rising Reserves

One sign of crisis abatement is the downward slide of the US dollar. As the market rediscovers its appetite for risk, the dollar's appeal as a safe haven currency diminishes. Indeed, the dollar has become the de facto carry trade currency. 

The market has renewed its faith in emerging markets, and the US has more tools to repair its trade balance and begin a phase of export-led growth? Is this a win-win situation? Not quite.

Although the dollar may be weakening, this weakening hasn't stopped central banks from accumulating more dollar reserves. In fact, dollar weakness may be accelerating accumulation.

Last week, several emerging market countries intervened in currency markets in order to prop up the dollar (or, rather, to push down their own currencies).  This involves buying dollars: Russia recently picked up $1.4bn in a single day, and $4bn in the same week.  

What are central banks doing with these dollars? Most of them are tucking them away for a rainy day, having seen the benefits of such accumulation during the crisis.

Crisis Roundup

European exports declined by 5.8 percent last month, the biggest drop since last January.

Understanding the European Central Bank means looking at its individual members.

The economic blogosphere really is a remarkable resource.

Bloggers at the IMF's ask, Did Islamic Banks in the Gulf Do Better Than Conventional Ones in the Crisis?

Did economic theory actually do a good job of predicting the crisis?

Greg Mankiw ♥ VAT.

Thoughts on exit strategies from one of China's prominent market economists.

Does China have a dollar problem?

Still confused about the dollar? Why do many of Asia's currency remain weak? Why are the euro and yen so strong, when their respective economies look weak? Bilal Hafeez, global head of foreign exchange research at Deutsche Bank is fielding questions from readers, which he will answer on Monday October 19.

World Economic Forum Financial Development Report

The World Economic Forum has released its Financial Development Report 2009, which scores and ranks 55 of the world’s leading financial systems and capital markets according to their level of financial development. It analyzes the drivers of financial system development and economic growth in developed and developing countries to serve as a tool for countries to benchmark themselves and establish priorities for reform.

The United Kingdom replaced the US as this year's top performer. America's fall is largely due to lower financial stability scores and a weakened banking sector:

 

The report also highlights the impact of the financial crisis on the Millennium Development Goals. Erik Feyen, Financial Economist in the World Bank’s Financial and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency, has written a chapter in the report that highlights this impact.

Below is an excerpt:

Exchange Rate Movements in the Crisis and Beyond

Editor's note: Sebastian Weber and Charles Wyplosz are from the Graduate Institute in Geneva. They are the authors of a World Bank working paper on Exchange Rates during the Crisis.

A key leitmotiv as the financial crisis unfolded was to avoid a repeat of the policy mistakes of the Great Depression, including the beggar-thy-neighbour competitive devaluations which have had devastating effects causing rising protectionism and a collapse of international trade (Kindleberger, 1973).

Unlike in the 30s, only some 42% of countries are officially pegging their exchange rate today, implying that movements in the exchange rate do not necessarily reflect official decisions, but are rather market-driven. Furthermore, governments today have many more policy tools at hand, ranging from fiscal policy over labour markets to monetary policy measures, making them less reliant on measures that are perceived as beggar-thy-neighbour.

While exchange rates have moved a lot since the onset of the crisis, these movements have mostly been interpreted as a byproduct of expansionary policies and the move to ‘quality’. Sharp depreciations in countries like the UK or South Korea have not been welcomed by the authorities, at least not officially. Intentions, of course, are hard to detect and no one will argue that expansionary policies were not needed.

 

Local Bond Markets: From Strength to Strength

Most emerging markets are having a better crisis than their G7 counterparts. One sign of robustness in emerging markets is the growing importance of their local bond markets. A new paper from Vox by Ismali Dalla and Heiko Hesse (of the IMF) takes a look at how local-currency bond markets are becoming a viable funding alternative for many emerging market issuers.

Not surprisingly, many of the countries that have succeeded in weathering the worst of the crisis (China, India, Brazil, Poland) also have substantial local bond markets:

 

Global Monetary Architecture Matters

Editor's Note: Nadia Piffaretti is an assistant to the Chief Economist at the World Bank Group and a Special Assistant to the Senior Vice President. She is the author of an upcoming paper on Reshaping the International Monetary Architecture.

The crisis has taught us that economists ought to believe their own warnings about systemic vulnerability. If analysis points out that a system can fail, it probably will at some point. Knowing what we know today, having experienced – in a sort of “real-life economic laboratory” – how systemic vulnerabilities can transmit and amplify shocks, we cannot avoid turning a worried eye to the largely imbalanced growth of the global economy.

Before this crisis, many economists had warned about another crisis – a disorderly unwinding of global imbalances. It didn’t happen. It still may.

While most recently global imbalances have been narrowing, due to short term factors (like oil prices), the IMF is forecasting a widening again starting in 2010. At the same time, conditions do not seem to be reunited for a clear shift of growth engines at both sides of the global imbalances, especially at a juncture when governments attempt to calibrate exit-strategies from fiscal stimuli, walking the fine line between possible fiscal unsustainability, and the risk of too early withdrawal of stimulus.

It is against this backdrop, and the realization that the international monetary architecture looks vulnerable indeed, that I reminded myself of the almost forgotten “1941 Keynes’ Plan” which the “Master” had elaborated in view of the Bretton Woods negotiations.

The plan stemmed from the idea that monetary architecture matters.

Weekend Reading

Real Time Economics interviews: Hernando de Soto talks about the effects of the crisis on the world's poorest, while our Chief Economist Justin Lin discusses China, the IMF, and stimulus packages.

Paul Kedrosky praises venture capitalists.

One quarter of US jobs are offshorable. It might not matter.

Unemployment is high on Europe's frontiers.

In other unemployment news, Ryan Avent thinks that the stimulus is needed to fight joblessness. Tyler Cowen doesn't.

The US trade gap narrowed last month. It is down almost 50 percent from a year ago. Could it have anything to do with the dollar?

Larry Summers dismisses the idea of a low-growth America.

Our East Asia blog looks at 60 years of China's development, and asks, "Are China's banks having a good crisis?"

The Cost of Remittances

A few months ago I attended a World Bank conference on Diaspora for Development, which featured several discussions about the relationship between economic crisis and migration. An important component of this relationship is, of course, remittances.

The World Bank estimates that remittance flows will drop by 7-10 percent in 2009.  Yet, because of the fall in foreign direct investment caused by the crisis, remittances have become a more important source of external financing than ever.

If remittances have become an essential source of external finance for developing countries, then lowering the cost of sending remittances would serve as a de facto foreign currency stimulus.

Which brings me to today's announcement that the World Bank has launched its latest remittance prices data series. The new website has a handy menu where you can insert different corridors and calculate the costs of sending money. It even lets you compare the prices of various banks. 

The database has been expanded to include 33 new corridors, and the following new sending countries: Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ghana and Tanzania corridors.

The least expensive corridors are Singapore-Bangladesh and Singapore-Philippines. On the other side of the table are Netherlands-Indonesia and UK-Sierra Leone.